Knick v. Township of Scott by Bronsdon, Alizabeth A.
Public Land & Resources Law Review 
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2019-2020 Article 1 
10-30-2019 
Knick v. Township of Scott 
Alizabeth A. Bronsdon 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, alizabeth.bronsdon@umontana.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, 
Constitutional Law Commons, Construction Law Commons, Courts Commons, Environmental Law 
Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Urban, Community and 
Regional Planning Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bronsdon, Alizabeth A. (2019) "Knick v. Township of Scott," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol. 0 , 
Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss10/1 
This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ 
Montana Law. 
Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) 
 
Alizabeth A. Bronsdon 
 
The Supreme Court overruled a 34-year-old precedent and 
sparked a sharp dissent by holding that a landowner impacted by a local 
ordinance requiring public access to an unofficial cemetery on her 
property could bring a takings claim directly in federal court. The decision 
eliminated a Catch-22 state-litigation requirement that effectively barred 
local takings plaintiffs from federal court, but raised concerns about 
government land use and regulation, judicial federalism, and the role of 
stare decisis. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the Court held that a government 
violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment1 when it takes 
property without just compensation, and a property owner may bring a 
civil action for the deprivation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983 at that time.2 The holding overturned Williamson County Regional 
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, which required a 
property owner to seek just compensation under state law in state court 
before bringing a federal takings claim under § 1983.3 The Court stated 
that Williamson County’s reasoning was poor and conflicted with prior 
takings jurisprudence.4 Additionally, the Court found the state-litigation 
requirement unworkable in light of San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and 
County of San Francisco, which provided preclusive effect to state court 
resolutions of takings claims.5 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Rose Mary Knick owned 90 acres of land in Scott 
Township, Pennsylvania (the “Township”), which she used primarily for 
grazing horses and other farm animals.6 Knick’s property included a small 
family cemetery where the ancestors of Knick’s neighbors were reportedly 
buried.7 In December 2012, the Township passed an ordinance requiring 
 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2.  139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019). See 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012) (“Every 
person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ”). 
3.  Id. at 2167. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at 2169 (citing San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)). 
6.  Id. at 2168. 
7.  Id. 
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that “[a]ll cemeteries . . . be kept open and accessible to the general public 
during daylight hours,” even if located on private property.8 
In 2013, the Township notified Knick that she was violating the 
ordinance.9 Knick sought declaratory and injunctive relief in state court, 
arguing the ordinance constituted a taking of her property.10 The Township 
withdrew its violation notice and stayed enforcement of the ordinance 
during the state court proceedings.11 Consequently, the state court declined 
to rule on Knick’s request for relief because she could not demonstrate the 
required irreparable harm.12 
Knick then filed suit in United States District Court, which 
dismissed her takings claim because she had not pursued an inverse 
condemnation action in state court as required by Williamson County.13 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, though it noted the 
Township’s ordinance was “extraordinary and constitutionally suspect.”14 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “reconsider the holding of 
Williamson County.”15 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In assessing the validity of Williamson County, the Court first 
analyzed its interpretation of the Takings Clause before discussing the 
state litigation requirement.16 Finally, the Court addressed the doctrine of 
stare decisis and whether an overruling was warranted.17  
A.  Fifth Amendment Takings 
The Court compared the Takings Clause to other constitutional 
protections and determined that Williamson County had gone astray as it 
created a different, more burdensome route for a takings plaintiff to reach 
federal court.18 In Williamson County, the Court held that a developer’s 
federal takings claim was “premature” because he had not first sought 
compensation through state inverse condemnation procedures.19 The 
Court identified two distinct elements of a Takings Clause violation. First, 
the government must take the property, and second, it must deny the 
 
8.  Id. 
9.   Id. 
10.  Id. 
11. Id. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. at 2169 (citing Knick v. Scott Twp., NO. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 121220, 2016 WL 4701549, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa., Sept. 8, 2016)). 
14.  Id. (citing Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F. 3d 310, 314 (2017)). 
15.  Id. 
16. Id. at 2170. 
17.  Id. at 2177. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 2174 (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985)). 
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property owner just compensation.20 As a rule, the Williamson County 
Court reasoned that “if a state provides an adequate procedure for seeking 
just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the 
[Takings] Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just 
compensation.”21 However, if there was no such procedure, the Fifth 
Amendment right to compensation would attach immediately.22  
Notably, Williamson County relied on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., which did not involve a takings claim for just compensation.23 
Instead, the plaintiff in Monsanto sought injunctive relief under a federal 
statute because it effected a taking, even though the statute included a 
special arbitration procedure for obtaining compensation.24 The Monsanto 
Court concluded that if the plaintiff obtained compensation in arbitration, 
there was no taking and thus no claim against the Government.25  
The Knick Court rejected this reasoning, noting that the fully-
compensated plaintiff’s claim would be moot because “the taking ha[d] 
been remedied by compensation, not because there was no taking in the 
first place.”26 The Court illustrated Williamson County’s flawed reasoning 
with an analogy: “A bank robber might give the loot back, but he still 
robbed the bank.”27 Accordingly, providing procedures to remedy a taking 
does not negate the fact a taking initially occurred.28  
The Court then noted prior takings jurisprudence, which 
established that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs at the time of the 
taking.29 In Jacobs v. United States,30 the Court held that a property 
owner’s claim for compensation “rested upon the Fifth Amendment,” and 
“the availability of any particular compensation remedy cannot infringe or 
restrict the property owner’s federal constitutional claim—just as the 
existence of a state action for battery does not bar a Fourth Amendment 
claim of excessive force.”31 Subsequently, First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles32 reaffirmed that 
compensation under the Takings Clause is a remedy for the constitutional 
violation that “the landowner has already suffered” at the time of the 
uncompensated taking.33  
 
20.  Id. at 2181. 
21.  Id. at 2171. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. at 2173. 
24.  Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984)).  
25.  Id. at 2173 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1018 n.21). 
26.  Id.  
27.  Id. at 2172. 
28. Id. 
29.  Id. at 2177–78. 
30.  290 U.S. 13 (1933). 
31.  Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171 (citing Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 17). 
32. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
33.  Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172; First English, 482 U. S. at 315 (citing San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U. S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)).  
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In addition to established precedent, the Court referenced the plain 
text of the Takings Clause, which states that private property shall not be 
“taken for public use, without just compensation,”34 as opposed to “taken 
for public use, without an available procedure that will result in 
compensation.”35 Therefore, if a government takes private property 
without just compensation, that government has violated the self-
executing Fifth Amendment, regardless of subsequent state court 
proceedings.36 Because the property owner’s constitutional right vested at 
the time of the taking, the Court concluded that the property owner could 
proceed directly to federal court under § 1983 at that time.37 The Court 
stated that such a scheme demonstrated  “fidelity to the Takings Clause” 
and “restor[ed] takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the 
Framers envisioned when they included the Clause among the other 
protections in the Bill of Rights.”38 
B.  State-litigation Requirement 
In addition to its interpretation of the Takings Clause, the Court 
found Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement “exceptionally ill 
founded,”39 and “a rule in search of a justification.”40 The Court 
determined the rule’s “shaky foundations” were to blame for its 
unanticipated result, which it deemed “unworkable in practice.”41  
The “unanticipated consequences” of Williamson County were not 
made clear until 20 years later in San Remo.42 There, a takings plaintiff 
who was unsuccessful in state court attempted to bring a federal Fifth 
Amendment claim for compensation.43 The San Remo Court held, 
however, that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, required 
the federal court to give preclusive effect to the state court’s decision, thus 
preventing the plaintiff’s claim.44  
The combined result of San Remo and Williamson County 
effectively barred local takings plaintiffs from federal court.45 The state-
litigation requirement created a trap for takings plaintiffs, and “hand[ed] 
authority over federal takings claims to state courts.”46 Thus, under 
Williamson County, the adverse state court decision both “gave rise to a 
 
34. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).  
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 2171. 
38.  Id. at 2170. 
39.  Id. at 2178. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. 
42.  Id. at 2169. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
43.  San Remo, 545 U.S. at 326. 
44. Id. at 347.  
45. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174. 
46.  Id. at 2170 (citing San Remo, 545 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C. J., 
concurring)). 
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ripe federal takings claim” and “simultaneously barred that claim, 
preventing the federal court from ever considering it.”47  
C.  Stare Decisis 
Finally, the Court discussed whether it should overrule 
Williamson County, or adhere to the settled law, despite its error, under the 
doctrine of stare decisis.48   
The Court noted that stare decisis “reflects a judgment that in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than 
it be settled right.”49 When overruling a past decision, the Court identified 
several factors for consideration: (1) the quality of its reasoning; (2) the 
workability of the rule it established; (3) its consistency with other related 
decisions; and (4) reliance on the decision.50  
Williamson County fell short in all respects. The Court found its 
reasoning “exceptionally ill founded” and the subject of repeated criticism 
over the years.51 In particular, it concluded that the state-litigation 
requirement undermined the force of stare decisis because its justification 
continued to evolve.52 Starting as an element of a takings claim, the 
requirement morphed into a “prudential” ripeness rule and subsequently 
into a new § 1983-specific theory argued by the respondents in Knick.53 
Moreover, the requirement proved unworkable after San Remo and 
ignored Jacobs and other subsequent decisions, which held that a property 
owner’s right to compensation vested at the time of a taking.54 Lastly, the 
Court determined there were no reliance interests of concern and rejected 
the argument that overruling Williamson County’s state-litigation 
requirement will expose governments or agencies to new liability.55 
Instead, the holding would “simply allow into federal court takings claims 
that otherwise would have been brought as inverse condemnation suits in 
state court.”56 
IV.  DISSENT 
A sharp dissent rejected the Court’s textual interpretation, use of 
precedent, and analogies. Justice Kagan, joined by three other justices, 
argued the Takings Clause was “unique among the Bill of Rights’ 
 
47.  Id. at 2169. 
48. Id. at 2177. See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019) (“[A] doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation”). 
49. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177. 
50.  Id. at 2178 (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. 
Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018)).  
51.  Id. 
52. Id. at 2178.  
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55. Id. 
56.  Id. at 2179. 
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guarantees.”57 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees 
protection against excessive force, the Takings Clause does not prohibit 
takings—only takings without just compensation.58 This distinction, the 
dissent wrote, is “an integral attribute of sovereignty.”59 
The dissent warned that the majority’s decision “betray[ed] 
judicial federalism,” as it will make “complex state-law issues part of the 
daily diet of federal district courts.”60 Wide variations among state laws 
can complicate the ultimate question of whether a land-use regulation 
violates the Takings Clause.61 Courts must first decide whether the 
plaintiff had a valid property interest under state law.62 According to the 
dissent, that question can be “nuanced and complicated,” and is unfamiliar 
to federal courts.63  
Finally, the dissent stated that under the guise of overruling a 
single case, the Court “smashe[d] a hundred-plus years of legal rulings to 
smithereens.”64 The dissent stressed the value of stare decisis and the long-
established preference for relying on Congress to correct conflicting 
decisions.65 For example, Congress could fix the San Remo preclusion trap 
with legislation allowing property owners to litigate in federal court should 
their case fail after a state court proceeding.66 Overturning precedent, the 
dissent wrote, “demands a special justification—over and above the belief 
that the precedent was wrongly decided,” and “the majority offers no 
reason that qualifies.”67  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Knick highlighted the complicated 
intersection of a property owner’s constitutional rights and the right of a 
sovereign local government to impose land use regulations. In finding that 
a federal takings claim is ripe at the time of the taking, and overturning 
Williamson County’s state-litigation requirement, Knick will make it 
easier for local takings plaintiffs to reach the federal courts. However, as 
the dissent noted, questions remain regarding how that procedural change 
will affect local, state, and federal land use regulations going forward, and 
to what extent the Court must justify its departure from stare decisis. 
 
57.  Id. at 2181. 
58.  Id.  
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 2189. 
61. Id. at 2188. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 2187. 
64. Id. at 2183. 
65.  Id. at 2189. 
66.  Id.  
67.  Id. 
